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Vileness: Issues and Analysis
Douglas R. Banghart
I Introduction
Under section 19.2-264.2 of the Virginia Code, the finder of fact may
impose a sentence of death upon finding that, inter alia, "[the defendant's]
conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim."1 Georgia and
Virginia have identical capital murder statutes. In Godfrey v. Georgia,2 the
United States Supreme Court struck down an application of Georgia's death
penalty statute because the trial court did not give an adequate limiting
instruction.' The plurality stated that "[a] capital sentencing scheme must,
in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.'"4 It further explained that a state which chooses to impose the death
penalty "must channel the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective
standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make
rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'"'
In the years following Godfrey, the Court has continued to emphasize
its "principal concern" that "the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily
or capriciously."6 It has stressed that "unbridled discretion" is unconstitu-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A., The
College of Wooster. Thanks to my parents for their support.
1. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999). See alo VA. CODE ANN. S19.2-264.4
(Michie 1999) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant's]... conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.").
2. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
3. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S 420, 429, 432-33 (1980) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. S
27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978)).
4. Id. at 427-28.
5. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v.
State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, J.J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)
(Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
6. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983).
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tional,' that states "must administer [the death] penalty in a way that can
rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an
appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not,"8 and that "death penalty
statutes [must] be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being admin-
istered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion."9
This article proposes that the death penalty in Virginia is administered
n a manner inconsistent with principles outlined in Godfrey and clarified in
later decisions." Specifically, and although the Supreme Court of Virginia
has concluded otherwise,1 it will be argued that even if the Virginia capital
7. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326-27 (1989).
8. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984).
9. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987). The Court has stressed this concern
in several cases. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374 (1988) (remanding case for sentenc-
ing because unclear jury instructions might have precluded sentencers from considering
mitigating factors and resulted in an arbitrary decision); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982) holding that any mitigating factor must be given some weight in consideration
of a death sentence because "a consistency produced by ignoring individual differences is a
false consistency").
10. See supra notes 3-9.
11. The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to provide a coherent explanation of why
the Virginia vileness predicate is constitutional when Georgia's identical predicate was not.
For example, in Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56-57 (Va. 1989), the court cited
three cases (discussed below) in rejecting the petitioner's constitutional attack.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978), was the oldest of the three cases and
cited as precedent by the other two. The court in Smith refused to declare the Virginia
vileness predicate unconstitutional because the United States Supreme Court had, as of that
time, declined the invitation to overturn Georgia's identical statute. Id. at 149. What the
court in Watkins ignored, however, was the United States Supreme Court decision in Godfrey
which accepted that invitation and overruled Smith.
In Turnerv. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1980), which was decided after Godfrey,
the court cited three cases (in addition to Smith) in upholding the vileness predicate. Id. at
44. Two of these, Mason v. Commonwealth, 254 S.E.2d 116, 118-19 (Va. 1979) and Waye v.
Commonwealth, 251 S.E.2d 202, 211-12 (Va. 1979), were decided before Godfrey and have
been overruled thereby. The third, Martin v. Commonwealth, 271 S.E.2d 123 (Va. 1980), was
decided after Godfrey but does not attempt to distinguish it. Id. at 126.
In Briley v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 57, 67 (Va. 1980), which was decided after
Godfrey, the court cited Martin, which, as was noted immediately above, does not attempt
to distinguish Godfrey, and two pre-Godfrey cases (Smith and Clark v. Commonwealth, 257
S.E.2d 784, 790-91 (Va. 1979)). The court in Briley rejected the petitioner's assertion that
vileness predicate was unconstitutionally vague on two grounds. First, without explaining
why doing so would address a vagueness challenge, it distinguished the facts of Godfrey:
"[The Briley murder was] carried out under... terrifying conditions... in afn]... inhuman,
outrageous, wanton, horrible, [and] vile manner(, and) ... [t]he entire massacre was carried
out in such a deliberate and premeditated manner, and with such precision and coolness, that
it could only have been done by those possessed of depraved minds." Id. at 66-67. Second, the
court distinguished Godfrey on the ground that in Briley the jury had heard the Smith limiting
instructions, see infra notes 39, 68 and accompanying text, whereas the jury in Godfrey had
heard no such instruction. As is explained infra at notes 39-48, 66-69 and accompanying text,
because the Smith limiting instructions are, as a practical matter, meaningless, the juries in
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murder statute is not facially unconstitutional, it is has not been limited in
a manner which makes possible its Constitutional application. At least
three arguments support this thesis. First, rather than limiting the jury's
discretion by "clear and objective standards," the judiciary and legislature
have permitted the acts which constitute "vileness" to slowly expand so as
to encompass any capital murder.12 Second, although mandated by state
law, the introduction of "victim impact evidence" to assist the jury in its
vileness determination is illogical under any conceivable relevance
standard.13 Finally, because the Commonwealth need not prove which acts
constitute vileness or whether those acts are vile because they prove torture,
depravity of mind, or aggravated battery, any possible guidance provided by
those sub-elements14 is illusory."
IL The Vileness Predicate
In order to impose the death penalty under the vileness predicate, the
Commonwealth must prove 6 the existence of one of the following sub-
elements: (1) that the defendant's conduct in committing the murder
amounted to torture of his victim ("torture"); (2) that the defendant's
conduct in committing the murder amounted to an aggravated battery of his
victim ("aggravated battery"); or (3) that the defendant evidenced a depravity
of mind in the commission of the murder ("depravity of mind").' This
article sets forth the argument that because the legislature has failed to define
these sub-elements, and the judicial gloss with which they have been painted
is meaningless, virtually every capital murder involves an aggravated battery,
and that those which do not inevitably evidence a depravity of mind.
Because of this, conditioning the imposition of death on such findings is
entirely nonsensical. 9
Godfrey and Briley heard precisely the same instructions: none at all. The two cases are thus
analytically indistinguishable.
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part ll.
14. For an explanation of why these factors are "sub-elements" and not merely "means,"
see discussion infra Part IV.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.
16. For an explanation of the Commonwealth's burden of proof as to this issue, see
discussion infra Part IV.
17. VA CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999). See also VA CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4.
(Michie 1999).
18. See infra notes 68-83and accompanying text.




In a state which constitutionally applies the death penalty, that is, one
which "channel[s] the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective stan-
dards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance' and that 'make rationally
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death,"'2 it might be
expected that the sub-element which has, over centuries of judicial construc-
tion, developed a simple and concrete definition would be that on which the
prosecution relies most frequently to prove vileness. Although torture is
such a sub-element, the Commonwealth rarely, if ever, relies on it.
Black's Law Diciionary defines "torture" as the infliction of "intense
pain to body or mind for purposes of punishment . . . or for sadistic
pleasure."21 In short, torture is a goal-directed infliction of severe or intense
pain.22 Several theories might explain why this sub-element is not relied on
by the Commonwealth. The first is entirely benign: As evidenced by the
facts as described by appellate courts, few cases in Virginia involve circum-
stances in which the defendant tortures, within that term's legal definition,
his victim."3 Given this, it may well be the case that the absence of prosecu-
tions based upon the torture sub-element is due to the simple fact that no
cases in Virginia involve torture.
A more problematic explanation, however, is conceivable. This expla-
nation derives from the fact that, as is explained immediately below, the
content of the appellate record of reported cases is indirectly controlled by
the Commonwealth. As was noted above, the absence of factual circum-
stances indicating torture is evidenced by the appellate record of reported
cases. The appellate record, in turn, is derived from the trial transcript. The
trial transcript, of course, is a product of the line of questioning pursued by
the Commonwealth's Attorney. The Commonwealth's Attorney's line of
questioning is intended to elicit testimony which will prove that the defen-
dant's crime involved one or more of the sub-elements on which the Com-
monwealth has decided to rely. Given this, even if all cases of "vile" capital
murder involved torture, if Commonwealth's Attorney ignored that sub-
element and instead focused his questioning on the depravity of mind
and/or aggravated battery sub-elements, then it would be expected that most
20. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., concurring); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., concurring)).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490(6th ed. 1990).
22. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 1 (1977) (noting torture
was originally used to extract evidence for judicial proceedings).
23. But see Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798, 813 (Va. 1982) (finding.systematic torturing of (the defendants] victim by slashing her with a machete and a knife,
followed by comprehensive mutilation, reflected relentless, severe, and protracted physical
abuse inflicted with brutality and ferocity of unparalled atrociousness").
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cases of capital murder, as evidenced by the appellate record, would not
reflect the presence of goal-directed intentional infliction of physical pain.
If this explanation for the apparent lack of torture cases is accepted, an
obvious question is presented: why might the Commonwealth choose to
focus the presentation of its cases on the depravity of mind and aggravated
battery sub-elements rather than the torture sub-element? One entirely
prudent reason is that this sub-element, unlike the others, requires proof of
purpose and, all things being equal, the Commonwealth would undoubtedly
prefer to prove less than more. In any other legal context, this reason would
represent nothing more than an efficient use of the state's resources. 4 A
second reason the Commonwealth might chose to ignore the torture sub-
element might be due to the fact that, as was noted above, torture has a
clearly defined and narrow common law definition. As is explained infra,
depravity of mind and aggravated battery do not.2" This means that while
what may evidence a depraved mind or constitute an aggravated battery is
open to reasonable debate, the common law has already drawn a line in the
sand as to what constitutes torture.26 As the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted in Smith v. Commonwealth, "any act of murder arguably involves a
'depravity of mind' and an 'aggravated battery to the victim.'27 Could it be
the case that the torture sub-element has been ignored because the other two
are so much more susceptible to expansion? Maybe.
It is probably safe to say that a Commonwealth's Attorney, as a person
of integrity, would not "roll the dice" with another's life; given this, when
a Commonwealth's Attorney makes the decision to charge a defendant with
capital murder, the Commonwealth's Attorney almost surely believes that
the evidence is such that the defendant deserves to die, regardless of whether
he also believes he will be able to make each of the twelve jurors come to
the same conclusion.2" Assuming this is the case, a rational Common-
wealth's Attorney would presumably prefer to be required to prove less
rather than more. In other words, it is probably safe to say that the Com-
monwealth's Attorney would prefer only to be required to prove that the
defendant committed capital murder and not have the additional burden of
proving that the capital murder evidenced vileness. This result would be
achieved if the definition of capital murder necessarily included the defini-
24. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 35-40, 66-69 and accompanying text.
26. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
27. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
28. To take the most extreme example, the Commonwealth's attorney might be privy
to overwhelmingly inculpatory facts which, because of the exclusionary rules, privilege
issues, or other legal reasons, would never be heard by the jury. Under such circumstances,
even though the Commonwealth's attorney might be certain that the defendant was guilty




tion of vileness. How then to get to such a result? Given a choice between
attempting to widen the definitions of two already broad and ambiguous
sub-elements or one clearly established narrow one, a cynic would argue the
Commonwealth29 sought to widen the already nebulous sub-elements. As
is explained infra, whether by accident or design, this is exactly what has
happened in Virginia.30 Because the aggravated battery and depravity of
mind concepts are so broad, a finding of capital murder almost necessarily
entails a finding of vileness. Again, were this any other legal context, such
foresight would be nothing more than farsighted and efficient legal practice
on the part of the Commonwealth."
The capital context, however, is not the same as other contexts: "Death
is different." 2 Again, in order to impose the sentence of the death the state
must use a system which "channel[s] the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and
objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that
'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'""
If every capital murder involves vileness, the jury is given no guidance in
determining who should live and who should die.34 Without such guidance,
the fact-finder's discretion is not limited nor is the process for imposing
death rationally reviewable by appellate courts.
B. Aggravated Battery to the Victim
After noting that the offense was unknown at common law (unlike
torture3"), Black's Law Dictionary defines an "aggravated battery" as the
"[u]nlawful application of force to another characterized by unusual or
serious consequences or attending circumstances such as a dangerous
weapon."36 Because the death of the victim has been the result of the
29. The Supreme Court of Virginia may be aware that the Commonwealth rarely relies
on the torture sub-element. As is explained infra at notes 39, 68 and accompanying text, in
Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149, the Supreme Court of Virginia provided what it purported to be
were (presumptively limiting) "constru[ctions]" of the vileness predicate. Id. Curiously, the
Smith court failed even to mention the torture sub-element. In fairness and to the court's
credit, the omission might be attributable to the simple fact that torture has already been well
defined at common law. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
32. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994); see Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (Stewart, Powel, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)); Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
33. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., concurring); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303
(Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
34. See discussion infra Part H B, H C.
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
36. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990).
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application of force, every intentional killing arguably involves an "agra-
vated battery." As is the case with the depravity of mind sub-element, this
was exactly the problem the United States Supreme Court sought to address
in Godfrey when it held that a state which chooses to impose the penalty of
death must do so with a statutory scheme which "channel[s] the sentencer's
discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and
detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death.'""
In upholding the statutory scheme struck down in Godfrey and purport-
edly providing the "specific guidance" thereby required, the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Smith "construe[ed] the words 'aggravated battery' to mean
a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the
minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder."39 What this "defini-
tion" was intended to encompass is anyone's guess. In practice, aggravated
battery has come to mean "murder plus." Specifically, the aggravated
battery sub-element requires the presence of some "bad act" beyond the
intentional killing. At first blush, this "murder plus" definition has a logic
to it; such a system is clearly fairer than one in which a mere intentional
killing is sufficient to uphold, but does not require," the imposition of a
death sentence. In fact, were it the case that the universe of defendants was
divided into two classes, those who committed mere intentional killings and
those who committed intentional killings "plus," the former receiving life
sentences and the latter receiving death, the system would operate perfectly.
Unfortunately, the universe of defendants is not divided into such classes.
Instead, almost all murders involve "murder plus." Because the universe of
defendants is composed almost entirely of the "murder plus" class, a jury
instruction which in effect instructs the jury that it may only sentence the
defendant to death if it finds "murder plus" is no instruction at all. A jury
instruction which permitted the jury to impose the sentence of death only
if it found "the defendant is not a potato" would guide the jury's decision to
precisely the same extent.
That almost every capital murder will involve "murder plus" is evi-
denced by the Supreme Court of Virginia's rejection of the defendant's
37. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
38. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 198 (1976) (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J., concurring); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
39. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
40. If every person found guilty was sentenced to death, no Constitutional problem
would, in the author's judgment, result. The problem is not that the death sentence is
imposed at all, but that it is imposed arbitrarily. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 285 (citing Gregg,
428 U.S. at 168-87).
1999]
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claim in Hedrick v. Commonwealth"' that the jury's conclusion that he had
committed an aggravated battery was based on insufficient evidence.42 In
Hedrick, the defendant robbed, raped, and then, at a distance of three to
seven feet, shot his victim in the face with the shotgun, killing her
instantly.43 Two things are clear about the defendant's conduct. The first
is not controversial: Hedrick committed capital murder. The second is: if
Godfrey's command that jury be given clear and specific guidance means
anything, there was clearly insufficient evidence to support Hedricks's death
sentence under the vileness predicate."
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that there
was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant committed
an aggravated battery.4" It is important to remember that, as a technical
matter, such a conclusion has a very specific legal meaning: specifically, that
the battery is one "which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder."' In other
words, even if the circumstances of the case are otherwise awful, unless the
defendant exerted more force than was necessary to kill his victim, the
evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he committed an aggra-
vated battery. In Hedrick, because the defendant killed his victim instanta-
neously, the battery presumably occurred while he was holding her down
as he raped her or while he bound her arms to keep her from escaping.4" If
this is the case, the question which, for purposes of satisfying Godfrey, must
be answered is: how might a defendant rob, rape, and kill his victim without
"battering" her? The answer might well be that he cannot. If so, every
capital murder will involve an aggravated battery. Given this, the jury is
forced to decide whether the defendant should live or die based on the
"guidance" of a characteristic every capital murder will share. As was
explained above, this is no "guidance" at all, and it is this unbridled discre-
tion which causes the Constitutional problem.
How then might the jury's discretion be limited? One answer might
be to impose the death penalty on all defendants who are found guilty of
capital murder under the rape predicate;49 another might be to only impose
41. 513 S.E.2d 634 (Va. 1999).
42. Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 640 (Va. 1999).
43. Id.
44. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
46. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
47. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. See also Peterson v. Commonwealth,
302 S.E.2d 520, 525 (Va. 1983) (A death sentence based upon vileness is not supported by the
evidence where the victim died almost instantaneously from a single gunshot wound.")
(citation ommitted); see Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433.
48. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
49. Doing so might be foreclosed by Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977). In that
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life under such circumstances. But because we have chosen to legislate into
operation a statutory scheme which does not mandate life or death upon a
finding capital murder, but instead forces the jury to chose between those
two alternatives once it has so found, the system must provide the jury some
guidance in making that choice. As Hedrick demonstrates, such guidance is
not found under the current statutory scheme.
Because, as explained above,"0 almost every capital murder involves
"murder plus," a catalogue of what has been found to constitute an aggra-
vated battery will not be presented here. Instead, presented below are a few
of the unusual cases in which the Supreme Court of Virginia stretched logic
to conclude the defendant's acts constituted an aggravated battery."
1. Can a Corpse be Battered?
Perhaps the most startling aspect of the aggravated battery sub-element
is that the battery need not occur while the defendant is alive. In Wbitely
v. Commonwealth,2 the defendant argued that because a battery requires the
infliction of harm on "another," and a corpse is no longer an "another," he
case, the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana statute which required the jury to impose
death upon finding that the killer had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
upon a fireman or a peace officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties. Id. at 634-
38. Central to the Court's holding, however, was its decision in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637. In Woodson the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a North Carolina statute which imposed the death penalty for all first
degree murders. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301. Woodson was premised in part on the Court's
conclu sion that, despite the fact that the state legislature had obviously found otherwise,.contemporary standards" did not comport with a mandatory death sentence. Id. The Court
has also explicitly noted that a mandatory death penalty would not be perse unconstitutional.
Id. at 287 n.7 (noting that under certain circumstances, for example, that in which the
defendant already serving life sentence is charged with capital murder, a mandatory death
sentence might be constitutional); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334 n.9 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 186 (1976); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287 n.7). Thus, if "contemporary standards" have
changed in the quarter century since Woodson such that they now embrace the imposition
of mandatory death sentences for capital murder committed under the rape predicate, see
generally Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics ofLegal Scholarship,
4 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 129 (1997), the case for the constitutionality of such a statute
could be made.
50. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
52. 286 S.E.2d 162 (Va. 1982). Seealso Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196,208
(Va. 1991) (holding that although aggravated battery 'ordinarily connotes] conduct preced-
ing death of the victim," corpse nevertheless may suffer aggravated battery) (citing Jones v.
Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (Va. 1984)). Given that a corpse can be battered, it
should not surprise the reader that a person need not be conscious to be battered. See Jones,
323 S.E.2d at 565-66; Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407,421 (Va. 1985) ('For purposes
of the 'vileness" determination, it is immaterial whether the decedent remained conscious
during the course of several assaults.").
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could not have committed a battery." The court rejected this argument,
negatively inferring that because the Supreme Court in Godfrey "was not
required to decide, and did not decide, whether an aggravated battery must
precede the victim's death in order to satisfy the vileness standard," it was
compelled to conclude an aggravated battery could occur after the victim's
death. 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia was certainly correct in recognizing
that Godfrey did not hold that the battery must occur during the life of the
victim. This, however, was due to the simple fact that the question as to
whether the victim had to be alive in order to be harmfully or offensively
touched was not at issue. What the Supreme Court of Virginia ignored in
Whitely, of course, is the fact that neither Godfrey nor any other United
States Supreme Court decision stands for the proposition that a corpse may
be harmfully or offensively touched.
2. Overkill?
Godfrey held that an aggravated battery is not proven where the evi-
dence shows that the victim died almost instantaneously from a single
gunshot wound." Presumably, this holding was based on the notion that
where the defendant has made his victim's death a quick and painless one,
his crime is less vile than one in which the defendant has unnecessarily
prolonged death. 6 But under this reasoning, the mere fact that a defendant
fired several shots at point blank range in rapid succession at a victim's head,
thus ensuring death, should make the crime even less vile than one in which
a single gun-shot kills the victim." This is not the case in Virginia.
Gray v. Commonwealth8 is instructive.5 9 In this case, the victim was
the defendant's wife's ex-supervisor. ° Several days after having words with
him regarding his wife's dismissal, the defendant abducted the victim.6 In
53. Whitely v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162, 169 (Va. 1982).
54. Id. (citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433).
55. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433. See also Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 525
(Va. 1983) (A death sentence based upon vileness is not supported by the evidence where the
victim died almost instantaneously from a single gunshot wound.") (citation ommittted).
56. This argument is borne out by the Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusions as to
the "psychological torture" component of the depravity of mind sub-element. See infra notes
70-75 and accompanying text.
57. Alternatively, Godfrey would be plainly distinguishable if the defendant was forced
to fire more than one shot because his weapon was incapable of killing instantly or if the
defendant intentionally directed his first shots at non-vital regions. In both circumstances the
defendant's action would prolong the victim's death, not shorten it.
58. 356 S.E.2d 157(Va. 1987).
59. Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 167 (Va. 1987).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 172.
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doing so, the defendant hit the victim with his "hand."62 This was the only
physical contact the defendant had with the victim. After the defendant
assured the victim he would not be harmed and commanded him to lie
down, the victim "lay face down on the ground, [and the defendant] fired
six pistol shots in rapid succession into [the victim's] head from a distance
of 3 to 18 inches."63 The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the
jury's finding of vileness was justified under the aggravated battery sub-
element.' 4 In a later case, the court clarified that "in Gray... we held that
aggravated battery was established by showing the victim received six
gunshot wounds, any one of which would have proved fatal, in rapid
succession."65 In no case has the court provided any possible explanation as
to why the mere firing of more than one bullet makes a crime vile.
C. Depravity ofMind
Depravity of mind is perhaps the vaguest of the three vileness sub-
elements. Although some murders are of course "worse" than others," it
* seems impossible to determine which murders do not exhibit a depravity of
mind. As was the case with the aggravated battery sub-element, if it is so
impossible, then it is necessarily the case that proof of intent would be the
only prerequisite to a death sentence.67 Recognizing this fact, the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Smith "defined" depravity of mind as "a degree of moral
turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the defini-
tion of ordinary legal malice and premeditation."" Again, what this means
is anyone's guess. Although it is impossible to define what does not evi-
dence depravity of mind, it is clear what does evidence depravity of mind:
62. Id. at 179.
63. Id. at 173.
64. Id. at 180.
65. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 208 (Va. 1991) (citing Gray v.
Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173 (Va. 1987)). See also Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450
S.E.2d 379, 390-91 (Va. 1994) (vileness established where victim was shot at least six times
with high powered handgun).
66. Compare Gilbert v. Florida, 487 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. A pp. 1986) (seventy-five
year-old defendant killed wife of fifty-one years who was suffering from osteoporosis and
Alzheimer's disease after she told him "I'm so sick, I want to die, I'm so sick... Ros I want
to die, I want to die.") with Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Va. 1982)
(defendant raped victim, striking her several times with a machete, almost cutting off her
thumb when she attempted to ward off his blows; forced victim to engage in oral sodomy
with him until she said she could not continue because of blood in her mouth; and then,
ignoring her pleading to "God, please just blow my brains out and get it over with," pro-
ceeded to mutilate her by stabbing and slashing her repeatedly, from head to feet, front, sides,
and back, including both eyes, as well as genital and rectal areas, with the machete and with
a knife that he removed from his wallet).
67. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
68. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
1999]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
(1) "murder plus" which does not lend itself to being construed as a battery
or as torture; or (2) any case in which the facts are particularly disturbing.6
Because virtually every capital murder will involve an aggravated
battery, and the tiny minority which do not will certainly demonstrate the
defendant's depravity of mind, a catalogue of the various factual circum-
stances which have given rise to a finding of depravity of mind will not be
presented here. As was undertaken with the aggravated battery sub-element,
presented below are a few of the unusual cases in which the Supreme Court
of Virginia stretched the boundaries of which acts evidence a depravity of
mind.
1. "Psychological Torture " as Proof of Depravity of Mind
Poyner v. Commonwealth0 is one of the few cases in which the defen-
dant did not commit an aggravated battery during the course of his
murders. 1 Poyner killed a total of five women. The first four murders
were conducted with the same modus operandi: Poyner would enter a place
of business posing as a customer, wait for a clerk to offer him assistance,
reveal a handgun, rob the store, and then execute the clerk with a single shot
to the head. In the fifth murder, Poyner also raped his victim. The
Commonwealth stipulated that the murders did not involve an aggravated
battery,73 which presumably means that Poyner's fifth victim did not
struggle when he raped her. Given these facts, and aside from the rape itself,
Poyner likely did not commit an aggravated battery. Due to the absence of
aggravated battery, the Commonwealth argued that the victims were sub-
jected to "psychological torture" before they were killed, and the fact that
Poyner subjected them to this "psychological torture" was evidence of his
depravity of mind.7' The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed:
[The victim] had time to realize Poyner's deadly purpose and to peer
down the barrel of a .38-caliber pistol in the hands of a person who had
let her get a good look at his face. She had time to realize that since she
could identify him she was a potential threat to him. After Baldwin had
turned over the money, he made her turn away and expose her back to
his gun. He did not shoot her immediately; he let her, indeed ordered her
69. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271,282 (Va. 1983) (noting that "deprav-
ity of mind can exist independently of the presence of torture or aggravated battery and may
alone support a finding of vileness as a basis for a sentence of death").
70. 329 S.E.2d 815 (Va. 1985).
71. Poyner v, Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 826-29 (Va. 1985).
72. Id. at 831.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 831-32 (citing Burger v. Zant , 718 F.2d 979 (11th Cif. 1983) (holding that
"torture" sub-element of Georgia statute may be satisfied by evidence of psychological
torture)).
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to walk away from him, toying with her, implying that she might be
spared. Then he shot her in the head.'
In expanding the depravity of mind sub-element to include the "psy-
chological torture" concept, the Supreme Court of Virginia provided an-
other textual hook with which a given capital murder may be construed as
vile. As is argued immediately below,76 such a textual hook is apparently
unnecessary to getting to the "vile" result; specifically, when faced with a
total absence of aggravated battery, torture, or depravity of mind, all a court
need do is recite the facts and conclude they are vile because they evidence
a depraved mind.
2. Total Absence ofAggravated Battery or Torture
In a system which "channel[s] the sentencer's discretion by 'clear and
objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that
'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death,""Z
one might assume that the Supreme Court of Virginia would necessarily be
required to use some sort of objective test in concluding that sufficient
evidence supported a finding of vileness. This is not the case.
In Sheppard v. Commonwealth,78 the evidence tended to show that the
defendant had executed and robbed his victims over an allegedly unpaid
drug debt." Sheppard was convicted of capital murder. On appeal, he
contested the sufficiency of the evidence in regard to the jury's finding of
vileness, arguing that "the record is absolutely silent as [to] the existence of
any physical or psychological torture. Aside from the shots that killed
them, the [victims] suffered no wounds or mutilation. There were no other
signs of physical or mental abuse. The record supports only the finding that
they were killed almost instantly and within seconds of each other."0 The
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument, concluding that the
evidence supported a finding of both aggravated battery and depravity of
mind. The court found that, under clearly established (if erroneously
reasoned) precedent,81 the evidence supported a finding of aggravated battery
75. Id. at 832.
76. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
77. Godfrey, 446 U.S at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976)
(quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253
(1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
78. 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
79. Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
80. Id. at 138-39.
81. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
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because the defendant shot his victim more than once.82 Its analysis as to the
depravity of mind sub-element was more troubling: "Executing two persons
in their home and then stripping their bodies of jewelry and stealing their
personal property manifestly demonstrates a depravity of mind." 3 Accord-
ing to the Court's "standard," depravity of mind was found simply in the
fact that a murder/robbery existed. Given this "standard" for depravity of
mind, it is not clear what murder/robberies would not support a finding of
vileness.
IIL The (Ir?relevancy of Victim Impact Statements
A. General Introduction
In Booth v. Maryland,s+ the United States Supreme Court held that the
use of victim impact statements describing the (1) personal characteristics of
victims and the emotional impact of the crimes on victims' families and (2)
family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the
defendant was unconstitutional."5 In Payne v. Tennessee,86 the Court over-
ruled Booth to the extent that it prohibited the use of victim impact state-
ments describing personal characteristics of victims and the emotional
impact of the crimes on victims' families.87 Specifically, the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit states from choosing to allow the
admission of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of capital
trials."8
As a result of the Supreme Court's retraction, the legislatures of almost
all of the states in which the death penalty is used enacted statutes or passed
amendments permitting the introduction of victim impact evidence in
capital cases.89 Although the Virginia General Assembly was part of this
movement, it was beaten to the punch by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
As is explained below, the court had already decided two cases which
permitted the introduction of victim impact evidence.'
82. Sheppard, 464 S.E.2d at 139.
83. Id. at 139.
84. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
85. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 503-09 (1987).
86. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
87. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that "if the State chooses to
permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject,
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar").
88. Id.
89. See Justin D. Flamm, Note, Due Process on the "Unchartered Seas of lrrelevance.•
Limiting the Presence of Victim Impact Evidence at Capital Sentencing After Payne v. Tennes-
see, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 297 n.13, 298 n.14, 305 n.61 (1999).
90. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
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In Weeks v. Commonwealth," the jury convicted and sentenced peti-
tioner to death for the killing of a law-enforcement officer who was per-
forming an official duty. At sentencing, the court permitted the introduc-
tion of victim impact evidence in the form of testimony from the victim's
widow and coworkers regarding the murder's effect on their lives.92 Al-
though the record is not clear, the trial court presumably allowed the
admission pursuant to the statutory provision which permits the admission
of evidence relating.to any matter the court deems relevant to the jury's
sentencing decision.93 The jury recommended death based on its finding of
vileness predicate.94 On appeal, Weeks argued that the victim impact
testimony was not relevant to the jury's sentencing decision.9" The Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected this contention citing Payne-which merely held
that the Eighth Amendment does not ipsofacto bar introduction of victim
evidence-for the much broader proposition that "victim impact testimony
is relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in Virginia.
Later, with no citation to authority or analysis, the court ruled that "under
Virginia's modern, bifurcated capital procedure, victim impact evidence is
probative, for example, of the depravity of mind component of the vileness
predicate."97 As is explained below, such evidence is not probative under
any conceivable relevance standard.98
In Beck v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified its
understanding of the role of victim impact evidence in sentencing."°° In
Beck, the petitioner received three death sentences after pleading guilty to
three charges of capital murder." 1 At his sentencing, the judge, sitting
without a jury because of the guilty plea, received testimony from the
victim s co-workers and friends." 2 On appeal, Beck argued that the Su-
preme Court's language in Payne stating that "[a] State may legitimately
conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder
91. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
92. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Va. 1994).
93. Id. at 389. See also Flamm, supra note 89, at 327 (citing VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264-
.4 (Michie 1996) (governing capital sentencing proceedings)).
94. Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 382.
95. Id. at 389.
96. Id. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)).
97. Id. at 390.
98. See infra notes 112-44 and accompanying text.
99. 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
100. Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898, 903-04 (Va. 1997).
101. Id. at 100. Although this ought to go without saying, the tragic but entirely
foreseeable result in Beck is proof positive that it is the most unusual case in which pleading
guilty to capital murder is even a strategy option, let alone the most effective form of capital
defense representation.
102. Id. at 903.
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on the victim'sfamily is relevant to the.., decision as to whether or not the
death penalty shall be imposed" foreclosed the introduction of victim impact
evidence from other sources. "0 The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this
contention, concluding that, assuming such evidence was relevant, Payne
limited only the nature, and not the source, of victim impact testimony. 1
4
Thus, under the Beck formulation of the standard for the introduction of
victim impact evidence, although such evidence can be gathered from a
larger pool of sources than was explicitly permitted in either Payne or
Weeks, such evidence may not be introduced if it is not relevant. 10
The Supreme Court of Virginia then turned to the question of whether
the victim impact evidence was relevant."° Reviewing under an abuse of
discretion standard, emphasizing that the evidence was reviewed by the
judge and not a jury, and noting that Beck had not raised a particularized
objection to any piece of evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined that "none of the declarants of the victim impact evidence received
by the trial court was so far removed from the victims as to have nothing of
value to impart to the court about the impact of these crimes" and that there
was therefore insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the trial
court erred in admitting the testimony.0 7 The court engaged in no analysis
whatsoever in support of this conclusion. Because the case for the irrele-
vancy of victim impact evidence to the jury's decision as to vileness is a
strong one,"' it might have been possible under Beck to prevent the intro-
duction of victim impact evidence where only vileness is at issue.
This possibility has been foreclosed, however, by the adoption of
section 19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code." This section requires, upon the
Commonwealth's motion and the victim's consent, the court to permit the
victims to testify before the jury.110 Because the legislature has determined
103. Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (emphasis added)).
104. Id. at 904 (holding that "the admissibility of victim impact evidence during the
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited only by the relevance of such evidence
to show the impact of the defendant's actions").
105. See Flamm, supra note 89, at 330 ("Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court's threshold
for excluding victim impact evidence is the point at which the prejudicial effect eclipses the
probative value; in contrast, the corresponding Payne threshold is the point at which the
victim impact evidence renders the trial fundamentally unfair.").
106. Beck, 484 S.E.2d at 905-06.
107. Id. at 906.
108. See notes 99-144 and accompanying text.
109. VA CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1999). See also VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A
(establishing rights of crime victims and noting that "[t]hese rights may include.., right to
address the circuit court at the time sentence is imposed").
110. S 19.2-264.4. "Victim" is defined in section 19.2-11.01 of the Virginia Code as the
decedent victim's spouse, child, parent, or legal guardian. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01(B)
( ichie 1999). The victim may testify as to any or all of the following: (i) the identity of the
victim, (ii) economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense, (iii) the nature and
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that public policy is best served by the use of victim impact testimony, its
use is of course less troubling than would be the case if such evidence was
admitted under the misguided and judicially legislated Weeks standard.
Nevertheless, section 19.2-264.4 is misguided for the same reason that Weeks
is. Quite simply, and as is explained below, victim impact evidence is not
relevant to the decision the jury must make regarding the vileness
predicate."'
B. Victim Impact Testimony is Not Relevant
Allowing the jury to hear victim impact evidence in the sentencing
phase of cases in which vileness is at issue is doubly wrong in Virginia.
First, the Supreme Court's decision in Payne, which implies that challenges
to the introduction of victim impact evidence are to be taken on a case-by-
case basis, is flawed in serious ways. A persuasive argument can be made for
the proposition that no state employs a statutory scheme in which victim
impact evidence is relevant."' Second, even assuming the validity of Payne's
conclusion that some states might have statutory schemes in which victim
impact evidence is relevant, Virginia is not such a state: as is explained
below, the jury in a Virginia capital case is charged by statute with the task
of determining only whether the defendant's conduct in committing the
murder constituted aggravated battery or torture or evidenced a depravity
of mind."'
The Supreme Court in Payne permitted the introduction of victim
impact evidence because it concluded that such evidence is "another form
or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm
caused by the crime in question."1"4 According to the Court, this "specific
harm" includes the fact that "the victim is an individual whose death repre-
sents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.""' The ques-
tion left unanswered was how "specific harm" was relevant to the senten-
cer's task.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens condemned the court for "abandon[ing]
rules of relevance that are older than the Nation itself and ventur[ing] into
extent of any physical or psychological injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense,
(iv) any change in the victim's personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships as a result
of the offense, (v) any request for psychological or medical services initiated by the victim or
the victim's family as a result of the offense, and (vi) such other information as the court may
require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-299.1
(Michie 1999).
111. See notes 99-144 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 124-44 and accompanying text.
114. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
115. Id. (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting), overruled
in part by Payne, 501 U.S. 808)).
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uncharted seas of irrelevance." 116 Stevens recognized that the majority
opinion reasoned that because, under Lockett v. Ohio,117 the defendant has
a right to introduce all mitigating evidence that may inform the jury about
his character, fairness would require that the State be allowed to respond
with similar evidence about the victim.118 As Stevens pointed out, the major
flaw in this argument is the simple fact that it is the defendant, and not the
victim, who is on trial. Because of this, the victim's character, "good or bad,
cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating or a mitigating circum-
stance."119 Stevens argued that the use of victim impact evidence therefore
caused two distinct Eighth Amendment problems. First, because the use of
victim impact evidence forces the jury to evaluate the culpability of the
defendant based on facts the defendant could not know at the time of his
crime, it has no relevancy to the defendant's personal blameworthiness,
which is the factor the jury is charged with evaluating. 20 Second, because
the quantity and quality of victim impact evidence sufficient to turn a
verdict of life in prison into a verdict of death is not defined until after the
crime has been committed, it cannot be applied consistently in different
cases. 121
As Stevens pointed out, the Court's decision in Payne represented a
serious departure from the traditional rules of relevance, because in all states
it is the defendant who is on trial. Because of this, the argument can be
made that victim impact evidence is not relevant to the jury's decision in
any state. Nevertheless, it is clear that even if there are some states in which
victim impact evidence is relevant to the jury's sentencing decision, Virginia
is not one of them. As is explained infra,12 the "specific harm" manifested
by victim impact evidence and caused by the defendant's conduct can not
116. Id. at-858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
118. Payne, 501 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Id. at 825-26 (majority
opinion)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982); Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]roportionality requires a nexus
between the punishment imposed and the defendant's blameworthiness."); Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender."); California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor J., concurring)).
121. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) ("[W]here discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433
(holding that death sentences must be imposed under system in which there is "principled
way to distinguish [the case] in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases
in which it was not")).
122. See infra notes 124-44 and accompanying text.
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aid the jury in performing the narrow evaluation the Virginia vileness
statute requires of it.'23
The case for the irrelevancy of "specific harm" and victim impact
evidence to the jury's task under the Virginia vileness predicate might best
be made by first highlighting two statutory schemes in which such evidence
is relevant. As was noted above, victim impact evidence may come before
the jury during the jury's vileness determination pursuant to section
19.2-264.4 of the Virginia Code. Again, this article proposes that the intro-
duction of evidence at this time is in error because it cannot assist the jury
in making the determination required of it under statute.124 Victim impact
evidence is also introduced a second time, however, and at this time it might
well be of assistance to the sentencer's task: Specifically, after the jury
returns a death sentence, the judge is required to "direct a probation officer
of the court to thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant and any
and all other relevant facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised
as to whether the sentence of death is appropriate and just."'2 If the judge
finds the imposition of the death sentence to be "appropriate and just," he
will adopt the jury's recommendation. The impact of the defendant's crime
on the victims might well be one of the many "any and all other" factors
relevant to his decision as to whether a death sentence is "appropriate and
just." For this reason, that the introduction of victim impact evidence at this
stage of the sentencing proceeding is mandated 26 is not objectionable.
In certain circumstances, victim impact evidence might even be relevant
to the jury's evaluation of aggravating factors.'27 Under the federal statute,
for example, the jury is required to consider the "[v]ulnerability of the
victim,"" whether the victim was a "[h]igh public official,""'2 as well as "any
other aggravating factor for which notice has been given." 30 Because these
factors require information about the victim, the information contained in
123. See VACODEANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999);seealso VA CODEANN. S 19.2-264.4
(Michie 1999) ("The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant's] conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, deprav-
ity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.").
124. See infra notes 127-44 and accompanying text.
125. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1999) (requiring post-sentence reports to
contain Victim Impact Statements). Alternatively, if the judge finds "good cause" in the post-
sentence report and the cases collected for comparative proportionality review, he may
impose a life sentence. Id.; see infra Part I. B.
126. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
127. But see supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
128. 18 U.S.C. S 3592(c)(11) (1999).
129. 18 U.S.C. S 3592(c)(14) (1999).
130. 18 U.S.C. S 3592 (1999).
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victim impact statements might well help the jury in evaluating those
factors.
By marked contrast, however, victim impact evidence cannot help the
jury to evaluate any of the three vileness sub-elements. The case for the
irrelevancy of victim impact evidence to the first two sub-elements is simple.
Both aggravated battery and torture clearly relate to the physical conduct of
the defendant in relation to the victim."' Victim impact evidence, on the
other hand, relates to the indirect impact of the victim's death on the
victim's survivors. Because there is no logical link between the physical
conduct used by the defendant in killing his victim and the emotional
impact of the victim's death on his survivors, victim impact testimony has
no relevancy to either the aggravated battery or torture sub-elements.
As was explained above, depravity of mind is the most vague, ambigu-
ous, and far-reaching of the three sub-elements. As a result, it should come
as no surprise that demonstrating that victim impact evidence is irrelevant
to depravity of mind is more complicated than is the case with the aggra-
vated battery and torture sub-elements. In Smith v. Commonwealth, the
Supreme Court of Virginia "defined" depravity of mind as "a degree of
moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.""' Unlike the aggra-
vated battery.33 and torture34 sub-elements, depravity of mind refers to a
131. See, e.g., Harrisv. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ga. 1976) ("This aggravating circumstance
involves both the effect on the victim, viz., torture, or an aggravated battery; and the
offender, viz., depravity of mind. As to both parties the test is that the acts (the offense) were
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.").
132. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978).
133. The defendant's mental state dearly has no bearing on the aggravated battery sub-
element. See Reid v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787,792-93 (Va. 1999) ("We have never held
that the vileness factor ... includes a requirement that a defendant's mental state embrace
the intent to commit an outrageously or wantonly vile murder, and we decline to do so now.
The number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is the essence of the test
whether the defendant's conduct [constitutes an aggravated battery.]") (citing Boggs v.
Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (Va. 1985)).
134. Although the definition of "torture" contains a state of mind component in that it
requires a finding of "goal direction," it is assumed in this article that the primary inquiry
under the torture sub-element goes to the defendant's actions in committing the murder.
This is because, in the absence of other evidence, certain methods of killing will strongly
suggest the "goal-directed" state of mind (for example, castrating and stabbing victim's eyes
out with ice pick), while others will suggest the absence of such a state of mind(for example,
a single shot to the head). Even if the reader rejects this proposition and concudes torture
goes to a substantive state of mind, the conclusion reached by the relevance analysis is
nevertheless unaffected: if torture contains a substantive state of mind requirement, then
victim impact evidence is not, as is argued supra at note 131 and accompanying text, irrelevant
to torture because it is similar to aggravated battery, but instead because it is similar to
depravity of mind, to which victim impact is also dearly irrelevant. See infra notes 135-44
and accompanying text.
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substantive mental state."' In other words, the jury infers the defendant's
state of mind from the way in which the defendant committed the murder,
which may, or may not, have constituted aggravated battery or torture.
13 6
Because the scope of the depravity of mind concept is not limited by the
facts of the case, but instead allows the jury to extrapolate from those facts
the defendant's mental state at the time of the murder, the depravity of
mind scope is necessarily much broader than are those of the other two sub-
elements. But victim impact evidence is no more relevant to it.13
As was noted above, the Weeks court suggested that victim impact
evidence might tend to prove depravity of mind but, aside from its citation
to Payne, offered absolutely no precedential or analytical support for this
assertion.138 If it were the case that the omission of precedent was due to the
fact that the statutory predicate used to sentence Payne is similar to the
depravity of mind sub-element, such an omission would be logically accept-
able; in other words, there would be no reason to reinvent the wheel if the
authority the court cited in Payne clearly supported its position.
Because the statutory predicate used to sentence Payne is not similar to
Virginia's depravity of mind sub-element, the omission was not an efficient
use of judicial resources, but was instead an abdication of the court's respon-
sibility to cite appropriate authority.'39 At Payne's sentencing hearing, the
prosecution argued that the impact the murders had had on the victim's
family members made Payne's offenses "especially cruel, heinous, and
atrocious.""4 The language of the prosecutor's phrase tracks the statutory
predicate on which the prosecutor relied in making his case for death.14'
Specifically, the predicate is established if the jury determines that the
"murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved
torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death."'42
In other words, this predicate refers to the acts committed by the defendant,
not his state of mind at the time of the murder. As such, it mirrors the
aggravated battery and torture, but not the depravity of mind, sub-elements
found in the capital statute.
Given this, under the "logic" of Payne, victim impact evidence would
be relevant to the aggravated battery and torture sub-elements, not depravity
135. See Flamm, supra note 89, at 332-34.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
140. Payne, 501 U.S. at 816.
141. See TENN. CODE ANN. S 39-13-204(i)(5) (1999) (stating that the heinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravator refers to murders involving "torture or serious physical abuse beyond that




of mind. But the Weeks court cited Payne for precisely the opposite proposi-
tion, that is, that victim impact evidence was relevant to the depravity of
mind sub-element. Thus, even assuming the Payne court's conclusion that
there is a connection, however tenuous and undefined, between evidence of
the way in which a crime was committed and the impact that crime had on
the victims is correct,' no such link exists between the defendant's state of
mind and the impact of the crime on the victims. This is because depravity
of mind goes to the defendant's substantive state of mind, while in the cases
of aggravated battery and torture it is the defendant's actions which are at
issue.' In other words, while Payne concludes, correctly or incorrectly,
that victim impact evidence is relevant to the jury's determination of how
bad acts are, Payne does not suggest that it is possible to infer the defendant's
substantive state of mind from the "specific harm" his acts caused. There-
fore, even assuming that victim impact is relevant to aggravated battery and
torture cases, which it is not, it is certainly not relevant to depravity of mind
cases, and Payne does not stand for the proposition that it is.
IV. Unanimity as to Vileness
Under existing Virginia law, the Commonwealth is not required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt which of the sub-elements make a murder
vile. In other words, it is permissible for some jurors to believe that the
crime is vile because it involved torture, others because it demonstrated the
depravity of mind of the defendant, and still others because it was an aggra-
vated battery of the victim. A similar result has plainly been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court.""4
In Richardson v. United States,'" the Court held that in order to convict
a defendant under 21 U.S.C. S 848,47 a jury must unanimously agree not
only that the defendant committed some "continuing series of [drug]
violations," but also about which three specific "violations" constitute that
"continuing series. " 8 The court's conclusion turned on its resolution of the
issue of whether the "continuing series of violations" was but one element
or, in the alternative, a series of elements.
Were it the former, the Court reasoned, the government would be
required to prove no more than that the defendant committed some series
of violations, but not any particular series of violations; under this theory,
the "continuing series" would be a single element, and the individual viola-
143. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
146. 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999).
147. 21 U.S.C. S 848 (1999).
148. Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1709-13 (1999).
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tions but the means by which the defendant perpetrated the element.149
Because the government need only prove the elements of a statute, and not
the means,150 the defendant could be convicted by a unanimous jury of
committing "a series" of violations despite the fact that no two jurors agreed
the defendant committed any given violation."' The court emphatically
rejected this interpretation. Instead, the Court held that each of the
"violations" composing the series was an individual element which must be
proven.5 2 In other words, the Court ruled that the three violations compos-
ing the series were the last three elements of 21 U.S.C. S 848, on which the
government of course bore the burden of proof. Although the decision in
Richardson explicitly involved a matter of statutory construction, not
constitutional law, the principles of statutory construction there discussedmight well have effect in the Virginia capital context. Specifically, applying
the Richardson reasoning, the Commonwealth ought to be required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt which underlying sub-element(s) support(s) a
finding of vileness."'3
As has been explained, the Virginia capital murder statute provides
three possible "factors" (heretofore assumed to be "sub-elements") which a
jury must find, alone or in any combination, in order to find vileness,
thereby making a defendant eligible for a death sentence.14 Two possible
interpretations of this statute are possible. This article argues that these
three factors, which provide the evidence and proof of vileness, are separate
elements requiring jury unanimity. The opposite position is that the three
factors are but means by which the vileness element may be found and
which therefore need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
There are at least two reasons why the factors are sub-elements and not
merely means. The first is a simple matter of statutory construction: when
a criminal statute describes how a crime may be committed in the disjunc-
tive, the words constituting that description are elements, not means. For
example, robbery is defined at common law as "taking by force or threat of
149. Id. at 1710.
150. To take the Court's example, where the government seeks to prove the "force or
the threat of force" element of robbery by evidence that the defendant wielded either a knife
or a gun, so long as all twelve jurors unanimously determined that the Government had
proved that the defendant had threatened force, it would matter not that some jurors
concluded that the defendant used a knife to create the threat while others concluded he used
a gun. Such a conflict would merely be a disagreement about the means by which the
defendant performed the element, not about whether he did in fact actually perform the
element. See id.; McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
151. Richardson, 119 S.Ct at 1710 (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624,631-632 (1991)
(plurality opinion); Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 499-501 (1898)).
152. Id. at 1709.
153. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
154. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
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force." As the Supreme Court has explained, "force or threat of force" are
clearly elements."' This is because it is presumed that where the legislatures
and courts have taken the time to describe specifically how a crime may be
committed, it is those actions which constitute the crime, and those actions
which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, courts
and legislatures have determined that what matters in the robbery context
is whether an act of force occurred or was threatened, not whether the
defendant used a knife or a gun in so doing. Likewise, the Virginia General
Assembly has determined that what is important in the vileness context is
whether the defendant's conduct constituted aggravated battery or torture
or evidenced depravity of mind, not how those elements might have been
accomplished. Given the heightened standard of reliability for capital
casesS and the fact that the legislature took the time to describe how
vileness may occur, it should be assumed that such descriptions constitute
elements and not means. As the Court in Richardson explained, this is
because allowing a jury to gloss over the differences in behavior, thereby
"permitting a jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details..., will
cover-up wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant
did, or did not, do."
157
Second, as has been repeatedly emphasized in this article, a state which
chooses to impose the death penalty "must channel the sentencer's discre-
tion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed
guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death." 158 By not requiring the jury be unanimous as to which
sub-element makes his crime vile, Virginia fails on both counts. If it matters
not whether some jurors believe the defendant committed an aggravated
battery, others that he tortured his victim, and still others his crime evi-
denced a depravity of mind, the sentencer is clearly not being provided
"specific and detailed guidance." Likewise, if the jury need not decide which
sub-element constitutes vileness, the reviewing courts cannot rationally
review the sentencer's aecision because it cannot know the basis of that
decision.
V Conclusion
It has been argued in this article that the death penalty in Virginia is
administered in a manner inconsistent with principles outlined in Godfrey
155. See supra note 150.
156. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
157. Richardson, 119 S.Ct at 1711.
158. Godfrey, 446 U.S at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976)
(quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253
(1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., concurring)).
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and clarified in later decisions. Rather than limiting the jury's discretion by
"clear and objective standards," the judiciary and legislature have permitted
the acts which constitute "vileness" to slowly expand so as to encompass any
capital murder."5 9 Moreover, although mandated by state law, the introduc-
tion of "victim impact evidence" to assist the jury in its vileness determina-
tion is illogical under accepted relevance principles."W Finally, because the
Commonwealth need not prove which acts constitute vileness or whether
those acts are vile because they prove torture, depravity of mind, or aggra-
vated battery, any possible guidance provided by those sub-elements is
illusory.
1 61
159. See discussion infra Part HI.
160. See discussion infra Part Hm.
161. See discussion infra Part IV.
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